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Typically referred to as the "red scare" or "McCarthy" 
era, the period from 1947 to 1954 was characterized by an 
ideological conflict which consumed all aspects of American 
culture.1 As prominent historians have argued, a salient 
feature of the time was the reflexive tendency of many indi-
viduals, organizations, and institutions to embrace the 
prevailing Zeitgeist that a serious internal threat to the United 
States existed.2 As a result, American society was propelled 
into a period of fervent anti-communism which produced one 
of the most severe episodes of political repression the United 
States has ever experienced.3 Public education was not 
exempt from this mounting tide of repression. 
Significantly, although several historians have portrayed 
the "red scare's" dramatic impact on American schooling,4 
the organized teaching profession's response to "red scare" 
attack has escaped serious historical scrutiny. The National 
Education Association (NEA), however, warrants special 
attention for many reasons, two of which appear salient. First, 
at mid-century the NEA boasted the world's largest teaching 
organization and claimed a membership in excess of 450,000 
educators.5 As an organization the NEA reached into every 
facet of public education and touched upon concerns and 
issues encountered by educators at local, state, and national 
levels. Attention to the policies and actions of the NEA 
during the "red scare" era, therefore, enriches historical 
understanding of this vital period in postwar American 
education. Second, by the establishment, in 1941, of the Na-
tional Commission for the Defense of Democracy Through 
Education, the NEA created the only educational agency 
explicitly and expressly charged to protect and to defend 
pubic school teachers from unjust attack. Close examination 
of the work of the Defense Commission, as it was commonly 
known, offers a broad and detailed perspective on the impact 
of the "red scare" on American public education and the 
effectiveness of the NEA's response to it. 
Public Schools Under Attack 
Historically, public schools and public school teachers 
have been obvious targets for "red scare" attacks.6 With the 
emergence of anti-communist sentiment and superpatriotic 
zeal in the years following World War II, their vulnerability 
dramatically increased. In 1890, high school enrollment in 
the United States was estimated at 200,000; by the early 1940s, 
the figure approached seven million.7 Schools became one of 
the few public institutions that affected the lives of nearly 
every citizen. They existed in every community and were a 
public institution that, in the words of historian Diane Ravitch, 
were conveniently "get-at-able."8 
Schools became embroiled in bitter socio-political 
clashes precisely because they wrestled with many of the 
issues that divided the country in the postwar era. Supporters 
of federal aid to education, racial integration of schools, 
modern or "progressive" teaching methods, UNESCO,9 and 
a liberal academic philosophy stood in stark contrast to those 
who argued for the sovereignty of states' rights, racially 
segregated schools, a "traditional" and disciplined educational 
environment, and a strongly nationalistic approach to world 
affairs. Accordingly, by the late 1940s, American education 
became a battleground on which strikingly divisive clashes 
of culture and ideology were fought out. Attacks on public 
education, principally led by individuals and groups from the 
political right, proved intensely destructive and impacted 
educational policy and practice in school districts through-
out the United States. 
That the NEA should leap to the defense of teachers in 
this politically charged atmosphere was somewhat inevitable. 
With considerable foresight, as early as 1941, NEA 
President Donald DuShane stressed to delegates at the 
Association's annual meeting in Boston that a "crisis" was 
developing in the United States. He argued that the NEA "must 
protect our schools from misunderstanding and unjust attack" 
and proposed the establishment of a special commission to 
assume this responsibility.10 Dushane's concerns were based 
upon recent historical experience. He, and others within the 
NEA, noted that during the period following World War I 
and throughout the Depression years, public education en-
countered vehement and destructive criticism. With justifi-
cation, DuShane predicted that with the impeding likelihood 
of war, tax-based funding for education would be reduced, 
classrooms would become overcrowded, teachers would be 
dismissed, salaries would be reduced, and criticism of 
teachers would become rampant. 
Several speakers at the NEA's annual meeting in 1941 
understood and predicted that critics of education would 
utilize "red scare" propaganda. For example, one member 
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noted the regularity with which the tax cutters, "the economic 
councils, the research bureaus, the merchants' associations, 
and the chambers of commerce" were accusing teachers of 
"subversive activity" and invoking "the shameful misuse of 
our patriotic spirit...to cripple the schools of the nation."" In 
the ensuing debate about the establishment of the Defense 
Commission, not a single objection was raised. Of signifi-
cance, as a testimony to how serious educators at this time 
perceived the attacks on education to be, the deliberations 
which followed centered on whether the assembly had the 
authority to appropriate more money to the Defense 
Commission than its proponents originally had requested.12 
To some extent the NEA's concern in 1941 that schools 
immediately would become the subject of intense "red scare" 
criticism appeared somewhat premature. Indeed, although 
attacks using the rhetoric and practice of the "red scare" sur-
faced periodically, the period from 1941-1947 appeared as a 
time of relative calm.13 Thus, instead of devoting its resources 
to challenging "red scare" critics, the actions of the Defense 
Commission primarily were governed by the desire to 
enhance educator-lay public relations, to improve the salary 
and tenure security of teaching professionals, and to conduct 
investigations in school districts where public schools 
became embroiled in educational controversy.14 
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the steady 
trickle of "red scare" criticism which surfaced in the early 
1940s soon exploded into a raging torrent of political invec-
tive. During this period the staff of the Defense Commission 
became almost totally consumed with combating the actions 
and rhetoric of "red scare" attackers.15 To those from the 
political right the use of "red scare" tactics and rhetoric 
became a very powerful weapon with which to attack liber-
als and progressives who saw the world through a different 
ideological lens. Set against the backdrop of the cold war, the 
ubiquitous fear of atomic attack, the perceived threat of the 
Soviet Union and the "loss of China," reactionary forces ef-
fectively could point to the dangers of supporting liberal poli-
cies allegedly "soft" on Communism abroad. Furthermore, 
the conviction of Communist Party leaders for conspiring to 
overthrow the US Government in 1949, and the dramatic 
prosecutions of atomic bomb scientist Klaus Fuchs and State 
Department official Alger Hiss, charged with spying for the 
Soviet Union, added credence to the theory that the United 
States systematically was being threatened by internal 
subversion at home.16 
The increasing virulent attacks on public education in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s should be viewed within this 
context. Victory for arch conservatives augured a reduction 
in tax support for public education, the maintenance of 
racially segregated schools, the removal of federal interfer-
ence, the rejection of allegedly un-American instructional ma-
terials, and the passionate celebration of nationalist ideals. 
Understandably, therefore, in the closing years of the 1940s 
and the early 1950s, American education increasingly endured 
hostile criticism.17 
Intense "red scare" attacks on public education mani-
fested themselves in several forms. Many of the most vicious 
attacks originated from the propaganda unleashed by the sud-
den proliferation of right-wing pressure groups which 
emerged in this period. These "red scare" organizations ranged 
in size, leadership, and style. Unquestionably, however, their 
combined actions and accusations effectively fueled the 
publics' growing belief that American school children were 
being poisoned by the pernicious influence of socialism. 
The most notable "red scare" critic arguably was Allen 
A. Zoll who venomously used his organization, the National 
Council for American Education (NCAE), to attack public 
education.18 By appeals to the patriotic loyalties of many 
influential citizens and wealthy businessmen, Zoll operated 
a well financed and effective organization throughout the "red 
scare" era. He employed a series of widely distributed publi-
cations as the NCAE's primary vehicle to attack public 
schools. They appeared with rapid regularity and appeared 
under revealing titles such as, "How Red Are The Schools?" 
"Progressive Education Increases Delinquency," "The Yale 
Whitewash," "They Want Your Child," "Socialism is 
Stupid," "Red-ucators at Harvard."19 
Central to the arguments expounded in these publica-
tions proved the conviction that American schools were 
infiltrated by "subversive" teachers and communist sympa-
thizers. For example, in "They Want Your Child," Zoll con-
tended, 
Early in the conflict, the strategists of the Kremlin saw that the 
key to the future of America lies in the education given to 
America's children. A N D SO THE INFILTRATION AND 
C O N T R O L OF A M E R I C A N E D U C A T I O N B E C A M E 
C O M M U N I S M ' S N U M B E R O N E O B J E C T I V E IN 
AMERICA. THEY WANT THE CHILDREN OF AMERICA. 
THEY WANT YOUR CHILD.20 
Masterfully, Zoll exploited local discontentment and fueled 
an explosion of "red scare" activity in communities across 
the nation. Citizens in school districts small and large were 
inundated with propaganda literature, "information" sheets, 
and accusatorial anti-communist pamphleteering. Frequently, 
these materials were used by local tax groups, patriotic 
organizations, or ultra-conservative citizens to attack public 
schools. For example, between 1950 and 1952 alone, 
evidence of Zoll's powerful influence turned up in commu-
nities in Michigan, California, Texas, Florida, Colorado, New 
Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Illinois, and countless other 
troubled towns, cities, and states.21 
Many other organizations similarly attacked public edu-
cation. The Committee for Constitutional Government (CCG), 
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for example, originally founded by wealthy publisher Frank 
Gannett in New York city in 1937, quickly developed into 
another extremely powerful right-wing lobbying organiza-
tion in the 1940s and 1950s. Led by a highly paid executive 
director, Edward Rumely, the CCG actively campaigned for 
the elimination of "socialized education"22 and sought 
fervently to remove alleged "Marxist influences" in the 
public schools. 
In the "red scare" era, the CCG developed into a promi-
nent, influential, and well financed political pressure group. 
As a measure of its financial clout, the Counsel for the 
federal House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities 
reported that the CCG spent almost $2 million for lobbying 
purposes, and in one seven year period alone, "distributed 82 
million booklets, pamphlets...at the rate of about 12 million 
pieces a year."2 
Another highly influential and well financed critic of 
education was the National Economic Council (NEC), an 
organization led for almost two decades by Merlin K. Hart, a 
noted right-wing activist, neo-fascist sympathizer, and head 
of New York's oldest chapter of the John Birch Society.24 
The extremist views of Merwin K. Hart and his colleagues, 
however, did not represent the position of an isolated reac-
tionary fringe. Significantly, among Hart's supporters and 
financial backers appeared some of America's prominent 
economic leaders. Hart received substantial contributions 
from leading officials in the General Motors Corporation, the 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Eastman Kodak, Beech 
Aircraft, the Shaeffer Pen Company, and the Los Angeles 
Chamber of Commerce. In addition, Hart revealed to a House 
Select Committee on Lobbying Activities that the NEC 
received more than $60,000 from Lammot du Pont and his 
brother Irenee from 1947-1950.25 Hart's influence also spread 
to the political arena where his views were received favor-
ably by Congressman Ralph W. Gwinn of New York, 
Senator James P. Kem of Missouri, and ex-Senator Albert W. 
Hawkes of New Jersey.26 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, public education 
eceived the political invective of a myriad of right-wing 
critics. Individuals and groups within established patriotic 
organizations such as the Sons of the American Revolution, 
he American Legion, and the Minute Women US A frequently 
attacked "traitors in the classroom" and "the enemies of 
America who infect the minds of the young." Extremist 
critics like J. T. Flynn, Amos A. Fries and Texas newspaper 
millionaire, R. C. Hoiles, who used his vast fortune and 
extensive newspaper chains to attack public education, fur-
ther fueled the anti-communist crusade and legitimized the 
use of "red scare" as a weapon of attack against teachers, 
administrators, and the school curriculum.27 
Attention to alleged subversion in the schools, however, 
lid not solely rest with the obsessive machinations of "red 
scare" groups. Attracted to the prospect of gaining enormous 
political capital for unearthing socialism in the schools, 
influential politicians at the state and federal level jumped on 
the "red scare" bandwagon.28 As a result of the Republican 
sweep in the 1952 national elections, investigations into and 
attacks upon educators dramatically intensified. Until 1951, 
HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee), origi-
nally formed in 1938, appeared as the only congressional in-
vestigating in existence. However, as anti-communist fever 
assumed a tighter grip on the nation, this situation soon 
changed. In 1952, HUAC acquired a new chairman, former 
FBI agent Harold Velde, and a new chief counsel, Robert L. 
Kunzig. Velde made his intentions clear from the outset. "I 
feel that we should look into the field of education. That has 
been left largely untouched up till now but I believe that it is 
a very fertile field for investigation."29 Significantly, in his 
relentless pursuit of subversives in education Velde was not 
alone. 
In 1952, Senator McCarthy, after assuming an investi-
gating committee of his own, gleefully announced that he 
would be "going into the education system" and "exposing 
Communists and Communist thinkers."30 In addition, between 
September 8 and October 13, 1952, the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommit tee (SISS), chaired by f iercely 
anti-communist Senator Pat McCarran, conducted a series of 
vigorous hearings into "subversive influences into the nation's 
educational system."3 1 These resourceful pol i t ic ians 
implicitly understood the enormous political capital to be 
gained from attacks on communism and alleged communist 
sympathizers. 
The investigating committees of Velde, McCarthy, and 
McCarran combined to induce anxiety and fear among many 
educators. Each forceful prong of this immensely effective 
"red scare" trident claimed dozens of victims. In Philadel-
phia, for example, 26 educators, who either invoked the Fifth 
amendment or refused to answer questions before the Velde 
Committee, later found themselves dismissed by the Board 
of Education.32 In March 1953, educators in Los Angeles 
experienced similar repression after Velde cast his "red scare" 
cloak over Southern California.33 In addition, in New York 
city, out of 31 educators who refused to cooperate with 
McCarran's SISS investigations, only five later kept their jobs. 
By July 1953, the Harvard Crimson estimated that over one 
hundred school teachers had been dismissed for non-coop-
eration with congressional committees.34 
The notoriety of congressional investigating committees 
also served to spark anti-communist probes at the state level. 
Investigating committees in New York and California, for 
example, appeared particularly virulent in their attempts to 
root out communism in the schools. Educators were 
similarly concerned by the renewed zeal for loyalty oaths 
which surfaced in many states. In June 1949, The NEA's 
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Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom published a 
nationwide study which reported on teachers' oaths and re-
lated state requirements. The comprehensive study revealed 
that 28 states required public school teachers to take an oath 
of loyalty, 38 states passed general sedition laws, 31 states 
prohibited membership in subversive groups, 13 states barred 
public employment to disloyal persons, and 15 outlawed cer-
tain political parties.35 Of concern to the NEA in the ensuing 
years was the dramatic increase in loyalty legislation through-
out the nation.36 
Directly or indirectly, the "red scare" had a profound 
impact on all aspects of American public education.37 Some 
of the consequences were somewhat absurd and trivial such 
as one member of the Indiana state textbook commission who 
objected to the use of Robin Hood in elementary schools be-
cause she believed that the story was a "communist directive 
in education" which "lauded robbing the rich to give to the 
poor."38 Typically, however, the "red scare's" impact appeared 
more serious and more dramatic. Some teachers lived in a 
state of constant anxiety through fear of dismissal. Others, 
troubled by accusations of subversion, worried for loss of 
their professional integrity and their status in the local com-
munity. For many, the trauma and uncertainty of the times 
strained personal and family relations, led to marriage break-
ups, and, in some cases, prompted suicides.39 
Without question "red scare" attacks directly led to the 
dismissal of hundreds of educators in communities across 
the nation. Historian David Caute, for example, calculated 
that more than 600 educators lost their jobs as a result of 
anti-communist political purges, 380 in New York city alone.40 
Furthermore, in cities, like Houston and Pasadena, where the 
Defense Commission shone its investigative spotlight, graphic 
evidence of the use of "red scare" methods to remove "lib-
eral" educators starkly was apparent. Although the circum-
stances of the many documented and undocumented teacher 
dismissals certainly remain tragic, arguably the most trouble-
some aspect of the period was the political and educational 
climate they induced. As Robert Hutchins noted in 1954, "The 
question is not how many teachers have been fired, but how 
many think they might be...You don't have to fire many teach-
ers to intimidate them all. The entire teaching profession of 
the U. S. is intimidated."41 In Houston, for example, a survey 
of the city's teachers initiated by the Defense Commission 
revealed an alarming atmosphere of fear and intimidation 
among the teaching profession. Indeed, 58 per cent of the 
Houston teachers sampled revealed that political groups had 
exerted intense pressure on them to slant the curriculum to-
ward a certain political belief and over 40 per cent expected 
to lose their job for expressing their personal political views.42 
The "red scare" also seriously affected how, what, and 
why individual teachers elected to teach. According to the 
April 1954 issue of the Defense Bulletin, a NEA study of 522 
school systems reported that, "American teachers are find-
ing it increasingly difficult to consider controversial is-
sues."43 The following year, a comprehensive study of thou-
sands of educators in every state of the nation bar Rhode 
Island, revealed that 13 per cent of secondary school teach-
ers and 15 per cent of social studies teachers were subject 
to "increased pressures against freedom to learn" and, as a 
result, tended "to avoid discussion of controversial issues."44 
By mid-century, many teachers appeared acutely fear-
ful of engaging in any subject matter which might be con-
strued as subversive or "controversial." They used textbooks 
and other instructional materials cautiously; self-censorship 
among teachers appeared common, and teachers used cur-
riculum materials judiciously for fear of alienating politi-
cal forces in the community. Caught up in the vortex of 
"red scare" propaganda, educators and public schools suf-
fered. In these difficult times, teachers and administrators 
looked to the NEA for support and protection. Accordingly, 
by the late 1940s, the Defense Commission assumed a more 
prominent, active, and influential role. 
The NEA's Response to "Red Scare " Attack 
The Defense Commission recognized at an extraordi-
narily early stage the danger to public education of sus-
tained and unforgiving "red scare" attack. Established in 
1941, for almost two decades, the Defense Commission 
appeared as the teaching profession's principal shield from 
"red scare" attack. If teachers faced unfair dismissal, en-
countered criticism laced with anti-communist rhetoric, or 
stood accused of subversive actions, frequently they turned 
to the Defense Commission for advice and support. In the 
"red scare" era, no other educational agency offered the 
range of resources and the breadth of experience to com-
pare with those of the Commission.45 
An indication of the NEA's mounting concern with the 
consequences of vicious "red scare" attack explicitly was 
revealed by the Association's commitment to allocate in-
creased resources to the Defense Commission. In 1954, for 
example, the Commission received almost five times the 
amount it secured ten years previously and, apart from the 
Department of Classroom Teachers, it received more funds 
than any other NEA commission or department.46 Concomi-
tant with its rapid growth in financial resources was the 
significant increase in the Defense Commission's staff. In 
its formative years, the Commission operated with a full-
time staff of only two individuals, DuShane and a stenog-
rapher.47 By 1950, however, it enjoyed a full-time staff of 
ten.48 
One of the NEA's most important and telling moves 
was its decision, in 1949, to appoint Robert Skaife as field 
secretary to the Defense Commission. Essentially, Skaife's 
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role was to provide direct support to educators in troubled 
school districts throughout the United States. Throughout his 
tenure, he proved a tireless and devoted servant of the 
Commiss ion and f requent ly appeared as one of the 
profession's fiercest opponents of organized "red scare" 
attack. Like many other influential figures in the NEA, field 
secretary Skaife realized that to be more effective required 
the Defense Commission to meet attacks against education 
head on. In 1951, he wrote that, 
deliberate, forthright steps should be taken to challenge 
untrue statements and false propaganda which are increasingly 
becoming a part of the stock in trade of the enemies of public 
education. The point has been reached where the profession 
can no longer sit back and ignore the charges being made.49 
Increasingly, the leadership of the Defense Commission 
reasoned that in order to counter criticism more effectively 
educators must be made aware of the source and nature of 
attack. Harold Benjamin, Defense Commission chairman in 
1949 and 1950, underscored the essential thrust of this policy 
in his address to the NEA delegation in St. Louis in July 1950 
in which he l ikened the Defense Commission to a 
"reconnaissance troop" responsible for gathering intelligence 
on the critics of education.50 
Throughout its twenty year existence, the Defense 
Commission worked assiduously to gather information on 
"red scare" organizations at local, state, and national levels. 
Using the NEA's extensive national network, by the early 
1950s the Commission had compiled a galaxy of informa-
tion on over 500 "red scare" organizations. Typically, the 
Defense Commiss ion used this intel l igence to alert 
educational personnel to the menace of particularly virulent 
public school critics.51 
Frequently, members of the Commission used educa-
tional journals as vehicles to convey their message. In the 
early 1950s, for example, Robert Skaife, authored a series of 
articles in the Nation's Schools which dealt exclusively with 
"red scare" attacks. Published under the revealing titles, "They 
Sow Distrust," "They Want Tailored Schools," "They 
Oppose Progress," and "The Conflict Continues," these 
articles portrayed the extremist position of the attackers and 
launched a punishing and forthright assault on their methods 
and practices.52 Similar articles written by Skaife and other 
colleagues within the Defense Commission also appeared at 
this time and unquestionably proved an effective medium to 
communicate valuable information to America's teaching 
profession.53 
The information services of the Defense Commission 
were not limited solely to the dissemination of writings in 
academic publications or popular journals. Throughout the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, the Commission offered a range 
of information sources to educators throughout the nation. 
For example, the Defense Commission popularized the 
availability of records, movies, novels, sound recordings, and 
"information kits" all of which focused attention directly on 
the attacks on public schools. In addition, the Defense 
Commission's information and re-prints service offered 
educators immediate access to articles, informaion bulletins, 
and fact sheets either free of charge or at exceedingly low 
cost. 
One of the most effective ways of communicating 
information to the education profession was through the 
regular publication of the Commission's newsletter, the 
Defense Bulletin. Early issues of the Defense Bulletin, 
mimeographed on letter sized paper, were confidential in 
general content and were distributed to no more than 300 
select individuals. By mid-century, however, the Bulletin 
boasted a national circulation of more than 20,000 educators 
and it quickly became an important and valuable mouthpiece 
for the Defense Commission.54 The contents of the Defense 
Bulletin alone serve as an interesting barometer of the 
escalat ion of "red scare" attack in the late 1940s. 
Significantly, in all of the issues of the Bulletin between 
December 1941 and May 1945, only cursory reference was 
made to "red scare" rhetoric and attack. From 1945 to 1955, 
however, scarcely an issue of the Defense Bulletin appeared 
without direct, and often dramatic and prolonged, reference 
to "red scare" propaganda. 
As a central component in the Defense Commission's 
quest to blunt "red scare" attacks, the Defense Bulletin 
performed several important functions. Three, in particular 
appear salient. First, it acted as a national source of informa-
tion for educators at the local level. It provided teachers across 
the country with a central forum for information, opinion, 
and support. Second, the Defense Bulletin suggested to local 
educators ways they might challenge their accusers. Under 
banner headlines such as, "Let's Nip this Propaganda in the 
Bud," "Let's Keep The Witch Hunters Out of the Schools," 
and "What You Can Do To Stop the Attacks," the Defense 
Commission published information which advocated that 
local groups take positive steps to confront "red scare" 
propaganda.55 
The third function of the Defense Bulletin arguably was 
its most important. At a time when some teachers and admin-
istrators encountered personal accusations of "subversion" 
and many faced threats of dismissal, the morale of the nation's 
teaching force sank to low and, in some systems, to desper-
ate levels. In an effort to elevate the status of educators and 
to raise the confidence of the teaching profession, at every 
opportunity the Bulletin published accounts of prominent 
individuals and organizations who publicly supported 
American education. In addition, the Bulletin published sum-
maries of research studies that revealed that "modern schools" 
significantly were superior to schools of the pre-war era. These 
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"Then and Now" studies boosted the morale of teachers and 
reminded educators of the enormously important work they 
were undertaking. 
Although the NEA and the Defense Commission often 
targeted educators, it also offered information to other 
citizens. For example, the Commission readily responded to 
requests for information from several sources which included 
the media, Congressmen, parents, and community leaders. It 
actively provided mimeographed sheets, information 
bulletins, article reprints, and leaflets on the attacks and it 
devoted considerable energy to answering phone calls and 
writing letters to those concerned by, or interested in, the 
attacks on public education.56 
As the "red scare" gathered momentum in the late 1940s, 
the NEA also expanded its commitment to improved public 
relations in an effort both to suppress and to counter attacks 
on the schools. In 1949, the Defense Commission initiated a 
series of educator-lay conferences explicitly intended to quell 
increasing "red scare" attacks on the schools. The "Off the 
Record Conferences Concerning Attack on Educators, 
Education, and Educational Publications" involved twenty-
two national organizations in discussions directly related to 
the burgeoning attacks on education. As the already serious 
situation worsened, in the early 1950s, the Defense 
Commission inaugurated a new series of conferences which 
operated under the revealing title "Public Education in a 
Dangerous Era." Convened in major cities such as New York, 
Philadelphia, Denver, and San Francisco the conferences drew 
support from prominent members of the local community, 
business organizations, taxpayer groups, the media, citizens' 
committees, patriotic organizations, and educators.57 
In an effort to stamp out undue criticism of the schools 
the NEA clearly recognized the importance of forging links 
with citizens' organizations such as the National Citizens 
Commission for the Public Schools (NCCPS) and the 
National Congress of Parents and Teachers (NCPT). The 
growth of these giant organizations revealed the intense in-
terest in public education which blossomed in the "red scare" 
era. For example, the NCCPS which claimed only 50 
citizens' committees in 1949, boasted 8,000 committees in 
1953. Similarly, the NCPT doubled its membership between 
1946 and 1953. Indeed, by 1953 membership stood at a 
staggering 7,953 located in 37,000 local PTAs in 50 state 
branches.58 
Not only did the NEA recognize the importance of 
capturing the support of these organizations, they also 
understood the importance of intensifying their own public 
relations divisions. In 1950, the NEA conferred departmen-
tal status upon the National School Public Relations 
Association (NSPRA) and aggressive public relations 
measures resulted. The work of the NSPRA amplified and 
extended the work of the NEA's existing Press and Radio 
Relations Division.59 From 1950 to 1955, a period in which 
the "red scare" appeared particularly acute, the NSPRA proved 
immensely successful in its determination to reach out to 
parents and lay leaders. For example, it continued actively to 
support "American Education Week" which, in 1955, 
encouraged an estimated 20 million Americans to visit the 
schools.60 It offered a plethora of information to educators 
such as the enormously popular "It Starts in the Classroom: 
A Public Relations Handbook for Classroom Teachers," "88 
Techniques in School Public Relations for Teachers and 
Administrators,"61 and the 1954 publication, "Let's Go To 
Press," a handbook designed to "help classroom teachers and 
other school press representatives to channel more and better 
school news to the local press and to build better working 
relations with editors and reporters."62 Handbooks also were 
made available to parents. For example, in 1951, more than 
300,000 copies of the NSPRA 12 page booklet "Our Schools 
Have Kept Us Free," a reprinted version of comments by 
Henry Steele Commager were distributed. From 1953 to 1955, 
the NEA also produced more than 850,000 information hand-
books to help parents further appreciate and understand the 
work of the schools.63 
Increased public support for schools, however, did not 
eliminate "red scare" attacks. Despite the NEA's many 
public relations accomplishments, it proved unable to 
diffuse explosive attacks in dozens of communities through-
out the United States. Two communities in particular, 
Houston and Pasadena, drew the concerted attention of the 
Defense Commission for the prolonged and zealous anti-com-
munist attacks on the public schools. Identified by the NEA 
and the Defense Commission as troubled school districts 
representative of other communities in the country, the 
Commission resolved closely to examine events in both 
locations. Accordingly Houston and Pasadena were accorded 
the intense scrutiny of one of the NEA's most prominent and 
well respected activities, a Defense Commission "investiga-
tion." 
Between 1941 and 1961 the Defense Commission 
conducted 29 full-scale investigations in towns and cities 
throughout the United States. Typically initiated by local or 
state education organizations, representatives from the 
Defense Commission were invited to examine local situa-
tions in which educators frequently received unscrupulous 
treatment. Investigating teams were sent to trouble spots in 
an effort to provide an "objective" report on the events and 
their causes and, perhaps most importantly, to offer recom-
mendations for improved educational relations in the 
community. Cases ranged in nature, intensity, and size. For 
example, some focused on educational controversies in large 
population centers such as Miami, Chicago, and New York 
city, whereas others focused attention on small communities 
such as Poison, Montana and Mars Hill, North Carolina. Some 
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investigations focused on incidents in which evidence of 
political interference in educational appointments proved 
conspicuous, others on incidents in which teachers were 
dismissed for participation in campaigns for improved salary 
and conditions. In the cases of Pasadena and Houston the 
Defense Commission sought to investigate the dramatic and 
intense anti-communist attacks unleashed on prominent 
school personnel in both school districts. 
Of the two investigations Pasadena undoubtedly attracted 
the greatest amount of attention.64 The reasons for this 
concentration on Pasadena are not difficult to understand. 
Simply, the Pasadena situation was the first major "red scare" 
incident to invite widespread national notoriety. The 
Commission's investigation principally focused on events 
from the summer of 1949 to the summer of 1951 and, as such, 
it alerted educators at a relatively early stage to the dangers 
of organized "red scare" tactics and propaganda. Moreover, 
the attacks in Pasadena brought down an educational "king." 
The dismissal of school superintendent Willard Goslin sent 
shock waves throughout the educational community. As 
president of the American Association of School Adminis-
trators, as an experienced professional, and as a close associ-
ate of many influential leaders within the progressive educa-
tion movement, superintendent Goslin symbolized the sensi-
tive, efficient, forward thinking educator par excellence. His 
forced resignation on November 21,1950, therefore, appeared 
as a dramatic warning sign to educators in school districts 
throughout the nation.65 
Houston and Pasadena shared remarkable similarities. 
Both communities became embroiled in ideological conflicts 
which surrounded the use of identified instructional materi-
als and teaching methods; both communities became deeply 
affected by aggressive "red scare" campaigns principally 
mounted by right wing organizations such as the Committee 
for Sound American Education and the Minute Women in 
Houston and Pro-America and the School Development 
Council in Pasadena, and; citizens in both communities ap-
peared persuaded by the propaganda of national "red scare" 
organizations such as Allen A. Zoll's National Council for 
American Education. In Houston, as in Pasadena, powerful 
right-wing business interests and conservative newspapers 
manipulated and fueled the crisis mentality of the "red 
scare."66 Decisive political elements in the two cities also 
shared a reactionary loathing of moves toward the racial 
integration of the schools or the re-zoning of the school 
district to ensure a more racially integrated society.67 In 
addition, the "red scare" in Houston and in Pasadena drove 
educators to self-censorship, restricted the creative energies 
of many teachers, and profoundly impacted classroom 
practice.68 Finally, despite evidence that no subversive 
activity existed in either school district, in both cities the 
promising careers of two prominent school administrators, 
George Ebey and Willard Goslin, abruptly were ended.69 
The effectiveness of the Defense Commission investi-
gations in Pasadena and Houston remain ambivalent. On the 
one hand, the Commission may claim considerable 
success. As a result of their lengthy inquiries in both cities 
the Commission produced detailed and comprehensive 
reports which identified common problems and suggested 
ways to improve the unsavory local situations. Significantly, 
in both cities in the years which followed the controversies, 
local politicians and school board members embraced many 
of the NEA's recommendations and implemented them to 
positive effect. The Defense Commission also proved 
successful in boosting the morale of a number of school 
teachers in Houston and Pasadena. Correspondence to the 
Commission from local educators revealed the comfort and 
solace that some teachers took from the forceful presence of 
the NEA in their respective school districts. The NEA 
investigations also served to alert other educators in school 
districts throughout the country of the need to be alert to and 
vigilant of "red scare" attack.70 For example, the Defense 
Commission, advised all teachers and administrators of the 
need to respond effectively and expeditiously to attack, to 
improved public relations, and to greater administrative 
competency. 
On the other hand, despite these accomplishments, the 
NEA's Defense Commission proved deficient in many 
important areas. In both cities the Defense Commission ar-
rived after much of the real damage was done and proved 
singularly unable to prevent the dismissal of George Ebey or 
Willard Goslin. Thus, while the Commission proved reason-
ably effective in understanding and identifying the source of 
the problem and in suggesting improvements for the future, 
it failed to address the violence of the attacks at the time of 
their occurrence. 
An overarching evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
NEA in its protection of teachers from "red scare" attack 
offers similar contradictions. On the positive side, the NEA, 
principally through the work of the Defense Commission, 
achieved some worthwhile success. The Defense 
Commission was one of the first professional organizations 
in any occupational field established primarily for the pur-
pose of defending its members against unwarranted "red 
scare" criticism. As the "red scare" intensified in the late 
1940s, the NEA and the Commission responded in kind. The 
leadership of the NEA re-enforced its commitment to the 
Commission by substantially increasing both its budget 
allocation and its personnel. Some of the NEA's most dy-
namic and influential leaders were appointed to guide the 
Defense Commission in its increasingly vital work. Indi-
viduals such as Alonzo B. Myers, Ernest O. Melby, Harold 
Benjamin, Frank Graham, Harold C. Hand, Willard Givens, 
Richard Barnes Kennan, and Robert Skaife71 passionately 
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sought to protect and defend the teaching profession. Accord-
ingly, as the "red scare" gathered momentum in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, rather than shirk from the challenge, the 
Defense Commission intensified its own efforts to defend the 
rights of educators. 
In a fury of activity, the officers of the Defense 
Commission collected and distributed a plethora of intelli-
gence on "red scare" attacks. It offered educators throughout 
the country advice, information, and suggestions for positive 
action. It vigorously challenged the efficacy of loyalty oath 
legislation and it questioned the political motivations behind 
state and congressional probes into public education. It 
highlighted the causes of individual teachers who were 
unfairly dismissed and, where appropriate, it exposed to the 
general public the unscrupulous political machinations of 
community leaders, local business interests, newspaper 
proprietors, and school board members. Through a concerted 
program of public relations initiatives and educator-lay 
conferences it also proved very effective in capturing the 
support of thousands of citizens. In addition, the Defense 
Commission gathered and disseminated an array of informa-
tion on "red scare" organizations which sought to undermine 
public education. Above all, the Defense Commission both 
alerted and united the teaching profession in particularly 
disturbing times. It comforted individual teachers that they 
were not alone in their personal defiance of harmful "red 
scare" rhetoric, propaganda, and activity. 
At the 1941 NEA annual meeting, the year the 
Commission was established, a number of speakers predicted 
that an effective Commission devoted to the protection of 
educators undoubtedly would encourage more teachers and 
administrators to join the NEA.72 In no small measure that 
prediction came true. In 1941 NEA membership stood at 
211,191; fourteen years later it had soared to 612,716.73 To 
some extent, this dramatic increase reasonably may be 
attributed to the Defense Commission's willingness to reach 
out to educators and to boost the profession's morale in school 
districts throughout the nation. Unquestionably, therefore, 
many within the teaching profession deeply valued the work 
of the Defense Commission. Indeed, repeated expressions of 
gratitude from teachers stand as the most significant testi-
mony to the Commission's effectiveness during the "red 
scare" era.74 
Limits of Accomplishment 
The effectiveness of the NEA in blunting attacks on the 
schools, however, should not be overstated. Despite 
overwhelming evidence that relatively few public school 
educators were communists, critics were able to convince 
many school board members, community leaders, and 
concerned parents that public schools were riddled with 
dangerous advocates from the political left.75 In the climate 
of "red scare" teachers were dismissed, textbooks withdrawn, 
instructional materials censored, and curriculum guidelines 
conveniently tailored to suit the wishes of reactionary forces. 
Of greatest significance, the NEA itself frequently proved 
a victim of the "red scare" age. Despite the unceasing efforts 
of the national organization, it frequently fell a casualty to 
the infectious tide of anti-communism that swept the country 
during the postwar years. The most graphic illustration of the 
stance of the Defense Commission and the National 
Education Association in this regard stemmed from the 1949 
NEA conference resolution to exclude Communist Party 
members from the teaching profession.76 The resolution 
originated from a comprehensive 54 page report drafted by 
the NEA's Educational Policies Commission. The report, 
entitled "American Education and International Tensions," 
was produced by a twenty person Commission chaired by 
John K. Norton of Teacher's College, Columbia University 
and included James B. Conant, president of Harvard 
University and Dwight D. Eisenhower, president of 
Columbia University.77 
Norton's explanation of the main conclusions of the 
report drew enthusiastic support from the NEA delegation at 
the annual NEA conference in Boston.78 His address 
frequently was greeted with applause and at the point in which 
he spoke out against Communist Party members having the 
right to instruct "your child, my child, and the children of 
other local citizens,"79 the convention accorded him a 
standing ovation. The overwhelming acceptance of the 1949 
resolution demonstrated the extent to which NEA members 
embraced the orthodoxy of anti-communism. Of chilling 
significance, the Association's adopted policy made extremely 
difficult the support of those accused of being a communist 
often whether or not they were innocent.80 
"Red scare" concerns also prompted many educators to 
teach about the Soviet Union in an explicitly biased fashion. 
The NEA leadership openly encouraged this dubious 
practice. Ernest O. Melby, for example, argued that students 
needed to learn about communism in order to be alert to its 
"corrupt propaganda."81 Consciously or unconsciously, 
members of the Defense Commiss ion and the NEA 
abandoned one of the underlying precepts of free and 
objective inquiry. Courses and curriculum materials explic-
itly were to be both anti-communist and slanted in favor of 
American democracy. For example, the 1949 resolution to 
bar communists from the profession was bolstered by a 
further resolution which asserted that "the responsibility of 
the schools is to teach the superiority of the American way ot 
life."82 Andrew Holt, NEA president, additionally added that 
teachers are duty bound to inspire "our children with a love 
of democracy that will be inoculated against the false 
ideology of communism."83 
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A further indication of the NEA's political conservatism 
was demonstrated by the Association's repeated flirtation with 
the practices and opinions of the fiercely anti-communist 
American Legion. Ironically, despite the fact that a national 
survey of educators revealed that the American Legion 
frequently proved one of education's fiercest critics,84 and 
despite the fact that its Magazine launched a caustic attack 
on teachers,8 5 the NEA and the American Legion 
collaborated on a number of important projects. Almost 
without exception the NEA-American Legion relationship 
during the "red scare" era centered on a blatantly 
anti-communist stance. The most graphic illustration of this 
was the NEA's decision to participate with 60 other national 
organizations in a series of annual conferences sponsored by 
the American Legion entitled the "All American Conference 
to Combat Communism."86 
The essential conservatism of the NEA and the Defense 
Commission also was illustrated by its position on teacher 
strikes, loyalty oaths, and state and congressional investiga-
tions. During the existence of the Defense Commission, from 
1941 to 1961, 105 teacher strikes were reported in school 
districts throughout the United States. In fourteen cases alone 
substantial data indicated the loss of 7,691,400 pupil days of 
school.87 The leadership of the NEA and the Defense 
Commission clearly understood and sympathized with the 
plight of discontented teachers. Occasionally, they supported 
industrial action euphemistically referring to strikes as 
"professional group action by professional methods."88 As a 
general rule, however, the Commission refused to support 
teacher strikes and warned teachers of the dangers of using 
them for short term gain. 
As the "red scare" intensified in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the Defense Commission increasingly sought to 
disassociate itself from the whiff of militancy. Labor activ-
ism and strikes, the Commission's leadership reasoned, 
smacked too much of socialism. To support such action in an 
age dominated by anti-communist fervor appeared tantamount 
to professional suicide. As a consequence, in May 1951, at 
the height of the "red scare," a Defense Commission investi-
gation in Oglesby, Illinois revealingly concluded that "it is 
unprofessional for teachers, through striking and picketing, 
to disrupt a school system."89 
The "red scare" also led the NEA and the Defense 
Commission to surrender the teaching profession to the 
imposition of loyalty oaths and state and congressional 
investigations. Despite the passage of NEA resolutions which 
objected to loyalty measures, the Association failed to advise 
educators to refuse to sign loyalty oaths or to shun 
co-operation with legislative investigations.90 Repeatedly, 
NEA members endorsed a resolution which stated that, "The 
National Education Association recognizes the right of legis-
lative bodies to conduct investigations....Educators called 
upon to testify in such investigations should do so fully and 
frankly."91 To a large degree the actions of the NEA and the 
Defense Commission were governed by the political expedi-
ence of the "red scare." The NEA's refusal to allow commu-
nists in the teaching profession, its brittle reaction to loyalty 
oaths and legislative investigations, its disapproval of teacher 
strikes, its appeasement of the American Legion, its inces-
sant quest to demonstrate the Commission's unerring loyalty 
to America, and its ardently anti-Soviet stance illustrated the 
extent to which the Association fell victim to "red scare" 
passions. 
To appreciate the actions of the NEA and the Defense 
Commission, however, one must take into consideration the 
practical alternatives available at mid-century. The ubiqui-
tous, all-consuming, and repressive force of the "red scare" 
in this period casts serious doubt on whether or not the NEA 
effectively could have encouraged teachers to refuse to sign 
loyalty oaths or to refuse to participate in loyalty investiga-
tions. Furthermore, in the delicate political atmosphere of the 
"red scare," few institutions or individuals in American 
society saw the practical wisdom of challenging the 
dominant anti-communist orthodoxy. Undoubtedly, therefore, 
the Defense Commission's leadership reasoned that to 
renounce allegiance to the American Legion, or to support 
the right of a communist to teach, or to condone and support 
teachers' strikes, or to advise teachers to stand against 
loyalty probes, was certain to invite damaging political 
reprisal. As such, the NEA refused to go out on a precarious 
political limb and suffer humiliating public criticism. 
The Defense Commission and the NEA also was aware 
that its actions were bounded by the broader economic 
climate which confronted educators in the immediate post-
war period. Robert Skaife, for example, reported that a 
Defense Commission survey identified the "high cost of 
public education" as the general public 's number one 
criticism of the schools in 1951.92 The NEA leadership 
implicitly understood that the Association's actions should 
not alienate or offend the general public. They appreciated 
the need to appear non-controversial, to be sensitive to some 
critics, and to be inherently conservative in many of their 
activities. Certainly, in order to win over the support of the 
general public, the NEA could not be perceived as a radical 
or un-American organization. Much of the work of the NEA 
and the Defense Commission's in the "red scare" period, 
therefore, must be viewed within this larger context. To a 
considerable extent, it accepted the political and societal mood 
of the age because it believed this to be the most effective 
way to harness widespread approval of public education.93 
The NEA and the Defense Commission kept its eyes on the 
prize: greater public support for American schooling, 
increased financial funding for education, and improved 
professional conditions and security for teachers. In its 
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hunger to accomplish these goals, however, the Commission 
undoubtedly surrendered some of its principles and integrity 
to the "red scare." 
Despite the committed efforts of its officers, the NEA 
could not stop the "red scare" from having a profound 
influence on educational policy and practice in the immedi-
ate postwar period. By the 1950s, the "red scare" which had 
flickered in the early 1940s, soon flared up into a raging 
inferno which engulfed American public education. The 
Association did not have the funds, the personnel, or the 
political or institutional allies effectively to respond to the 
crisis. Unquestionably, the Defense Commission did 
extinguish isolated fires. For example, it dampened the 
influence of individual critics like Allen A. Zoll and it helped 
to diffuse attacks in selected communities. However, partly 
because the NEA and the Defense Commission failed to 
appreciate the enormity of the "red scare" and the influential, 
political, business, and reactionary forces behind it, it alone 
could never eliminate all "red scare" attack. 
Of greatest significance, because the NEA's Defense 
Commission accepted many of the underlying assumptions 
of the prevailing anti-communist mindset, it failed seriously 
to influence or to challenge the essence of the "red scare" 
which so dramatically shaped American culture in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. Ultimately, communism was to have 
profoundly less of an impact on American education than the 
debilitating forces of anti-communism. In the final analysis, 
the "red scare" proved such a powerful and dominant force 
that the NEA appeared unable, and at times unwilling, to 
prevent this ironic reality. 
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